



Britain’s Household Benefit Cap restricts the amount of benefit income unemployed 
households can receive. In this article, it is examined using material held at the UK’s 
National Archives recording debates about a proposal to introduce a similar policy – a benefit 
limit – in the first Thatcher Conservative government elected in 1979. It was rejected, but the 
Household Benefit Cap was introduced three decades later. The article locates debates about, 
and the practice of restricting benefit income, in perennial social security concerns with the 
financial incentive to do waged work. The article argues that while there are material 
differences that help explain the different policy outcomes in 1980 and 2010, they can 
primarily be explained by changing ideas about the roles of social security policy, including 
the development of the ‘incentive paradigm’ concerned with manipulating behaviour; a loss 
of concern with the hardship that would come with the introduction of a benefit restriction 
and a view that institutions other than the state are better placed to address poverty and 
buttress work incentives. 
 
Introduction 
As part of its aim to cut social security spending by £18 billion per annum by 2014/15 the 
newly established Conservative/Liberal Democratic Coalition government in Britain 
announced in 2010 a Household Benefit Cap (HBC) was to be introduced to restrict the 
amount of benefit paid to working-age households. There were to be exceptions linked to 
‘caring’, disability and low paid work. Introduced in 2013, the HBC was set at median 
earnings for households containing dependent children (£26,000 a year) and 70 percent of 
these (£18,200) for childless households. In the 2015 Summer Budget the HBC was lowered 
to £20,000 per annum (£23,000 for people living in Greater London) for households with 
2 
 
dependent children and £13,400 (£15,410 for Greater London) for childless households 
(Kennedy et. al, 2016). 
 
The literature examining the HBC focuses upon ways in which it discriminates 
against, and impacts upon, particular geographies and social groups (Beatty and Fothergill, 
2014; Hamnett, 2014; Hollingsworth, 2015; Palmer, 2015; Simpson, 2017; Lammasniem, 
2019). This literature associates the HBC with post-2010 ‘austerity’, thereby linking benefit 
restrictions to periods when anti-social welfare sentiments have framed social security policy 
and to right-wing governments. Restricting benefit income, however, is not just something 
associated with ‘austerity’ and the political right. Various countries, with governments of 
different political persuasions have limits to benefit income (Esser et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
in Britain, there have been different forms of limits on poverty relief incomes over a long 
period of time. Poor relief, for example, often oscillated with changing local wages (Grover, 
2016), while the Wage Stop1 operated between the 1930s and 1970s. It restricted social 
assistance to what recipients might be expected to earn if they were in work. It was 
introduced by a National government and survived Conservative, Labour and Coalition 
governments. The HBC, therefore, represents a new approach to an old dilemma: how to 
provide financial support for unemployed people while not eroding the financial incentive for 
people to do waged work. 
 
                                                          
1 The Wage Stop was introduced when the Unemployment Assistance Board was formed in 1935. It was argued 
it would ensure ‘fairness’ between income poor people who were in and out of full-time waged work. People in 
such work were unable to claim financial support, even if their wages were below benefit levels, while those 
people who were out of work might be entitled to benefits similar in level to, or higher than, wages they might 
earn. This was later to be described as the ‘principle of “equal misery”’ (The Wage Stop. A Reappraisal, 
Supplementary Benefits Commission, April 1974, NA AST/36/1439). It was also argued that the Wage Stop 
was required to ensure a financial incentive for people to do waged work in what was a 1930s restatement of the 
poor law doctrine of ‘less eligibility’ – that the ‘situation [of the pauper] on the whole shall not be made really 
or apparently so eligible as the situation of the independent labourer of the lowest class.’ (Checkland and 
Checkland, 1974, p. 335) 
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In this article the development of the HBC is understood with reference to 
consideration in the first Thatcher government of the introduction of what was variously 
described as a ‘benefit cut-off’, ‘benefit limit’ (used in this article) and ‘total income limit’. It 
was not introduced. The author examined 70 files at the UK’s National Archives identified 
through keyword searches, including ‘Wage Stop’, ‘benefit limit’, ‘total income limit’ and 
combinations of ‘work’, ‘incentives’, ‘disincentives’, ‘assistance’, ‘benefit’ and ‘social 
security’. The searches were limited by date parameters of 1920 and 1990. The files 
examined included cabinet minutes and papers, and correspondence between ministers and 
between them and the prime minister (the records of the ‘core executive’) and ‘lower level’ 
records of various government departments and its agencies, primarily the then Department 
of Health and Social Security, HM Treasury and the Supplementary Benefits Commission 
(SBC).2  
 
Social security policy and work incentives 
At the centre of social security policy for working age people is a perceived policy 
contradiction; that if the needs of people who are not in waged work are relieved, they will be 
disincentivised from taking waged work when it is available or incentivised to leave work for 
unemployment (Grover, 2016). Work incentives have been the focus of a range of policy-
related literature, including that concerned with social security policy (including Whiteford 
and Millar, 1994; Walker, 1998; Benda et al., 2020); labour market economics (for example, 
Maki and Spindler, 1975, 1979; Atkinson and Fleming, 1978; Kay, Norris and Warren, 1980; 
Britton, 1997) and that concerned with relationships between social policy and capitalist 
imperatives (for instance, Offe, 1984; Novak, 1988). While being embedded in different 
                                                          
2 An arms-length government body responsible for administering Supplementary Benefit, introduced in 1966 as 
Britain’s social assistance scheme, replacing National Assistance. 
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intellectual traditions, what unites these literatures is a concern with how social policy, and 
more specifically social security policy, might act to encourage or discourage people to 
commodify, to sell, their labour power.  
 
This is clearly articulated in Penna and O’Brien’s (1998, p. 66) observation that the 
capitalist state ensures labour power is a ‘commodity to be exchanged in a competitive 
economic system’. The most important way in which it does this is via defining who, and 
when and under what conditions they, can claim to be legitimately outside of labour markets 
(Offe, 1984). There are various means through which states might do this, for instance, via 
what Clasen and Clegg (2007) describe as the ‘levels’ and ‘levers’ of conditionality and, 
more importantly for the purposes of this article, the level at which benefits are set. While, as 
work on policy (Grover, 2016) and public attitudes (Hudson et. al., 2017) suggests, concern 
with work incentives is long-standing, it is possible to argue that in recent decades it has 
become particularly important. Drawing upon van der Veen and Trommell (1999), for 
example, Wright (2013, p. 319) frames developments in ‘welfare to work’ policies since the 
1990s by the idea of the “‘incentive paradigm’… which views behaviour as driven 
overwhelmingly by individual economic gain’ and is central to contemporary activation 
policies. As Dinan (2019, p. 4) argues, such activation may be introduced ‘by merely 
reducing benefit generosity’. Such an approach to cutting the value of benefits has the 
theoretical impact of increasing the costs of waged work inactivity and, in an ideal-typical 
sense, can be described as being a ‘negative’ (Bonoli, 2010), ‘defensive’ (Torfing, 1999) 
and/or ‘liberal’ (Barbier, 2004) approach to activation-related policies. As Hussain et al. 
(2020) note in their analysis of racialised differences in benefit levels in Denmark, that lower 
benefit levels operate on the premise that they intensify job search activity and to reduce 
opportunities for claimants to be too selective in their choice of work. They do this by 
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impoverishing people, an issue that in Britain has been central to debates about, and the 
practice of, limiting benefit income.  
 
An aborted benefit limit 
The 1979 Conservative Party’s election manifesto noted that if elected a Conservative 
government would ‘restore the incentive to work’.3 While it primarily argued this would 
involve cuts to income tax, when in power it soon became apparent that the first Thatcher 
government was also concerned with the intersection between wage and benefit levels. This 
should not be surprising for at least three reasons. First, externally there was concern with the 
issue of the duration of unemployment and explanations of it (Norris (1978a, 1978b). 
‘Voluntary unemployment’ and work incentives were central to such concerns. Vocal 
backbench MP, Ralph Howell, economists and analysts, and pressure groups and the Trade 
Union Congress were in various ways questioning how the social security system affected 
financial incentives to do waged work (for example, Maki and Spindler, 1975, 1979; Howell, 
1976; Atkinson and Fleming, 1978; Kay, Norris and Warren, 1980; Nickell, 1980). 
 
Second, within the institutions of social security there was interest in work incentive 
issues. So, for instance, in the context of increasing unemployment and a belief among local 
office staff that a ‘good number of Supp Ben [Supplementary Benefit] claimants are better off 
on benefit than in such work’4 in 1975 the SBC felt a need to inform senior staff of the point 
at which it financially paid unemployed people to be in work. Then in 1978 the DHSS 
commissioned a longitudinal cohort survey of unemployed men that, in part, was to examine 
work incentives (Clark, 1978).  
                                                          
3 https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/110858. 





Third, work incentives had been a longer-term concern of the Conservative Party. The 
1970-74 Heath-led Conservative government, for example, introduced as a work incentive 
measure the first-ever means-tested benefit (Family Income Supplement (FIS)) in Britain 
solely for people in full-time work. It was a consequence of concerns raised in the 1960s 
about families (thought to be 140,000) whose in-work incomes was estimated to be below 
their social assistance entitlement (Ministry of Social Security, 1967) and which the 1964-
1970 Labour government was argued to have failed in policy terms (Banting, 1979). By 
1979, however, the politics of work incentives had changed. The Heath government was 
informed by One Nation Conservatism, the 1979 Thatcher government by neoliberalism, 
which suggested the economic dilemmas Britain faced could be explained by state-induced 
passivity and ‘dependency’ (Hickson, 2010). In this context, the work incentive issue 
confirmed the folly of state intervention, a theme that framed discussions of the possible 
introduction of a benefit limit in 1980. 
 
The idea was first raised in discussions about the possible abolition of the Earnings-
Related Supplement to social insurance benefits.5 Howe was asked by the influential 
Ministerial Committee for Economic Policy (E Committee) to arrange a study of factors 
affecting work incentives.6 This was conducted by the Ad Hoc Committee on Work 
Incentives and Income Compression. Its report argued it was empirically difficult to establish 
the ‘precise scale and shape of the in work, out of work and poverty trap problems’. 
                                                          
5 Introduced in 1966, earnings related supplements were informed by social justice-related arguments about the 
relief of need and arguments about labour market efficiency – that higher benefits would enable better paid 
workers to seek work more suited to their skills, rather than taking the first available job because of a reduction 
in their income caused by unemployment (Micklewright, 1989). 
6 Cabinet Conclusions CC(79)18, 25/10/1979, NA CAB/128/66/18. 
7 
 
Nevertheless, Howe believed the ‘problems certainly exist’.7 He accepted the Committee’s 
view that the incentive to work (the in work/out of work problem) was more important than 
poverty trap, but argued its analysis was lacking because it: 
 
...underrates the inherent unattractiveness of working as against not working, and the 
need for substantial income differentials. This combination both encourages and 
provides an opportunity for a person to stay at home, operate as his [sic] own master 
and forgo the constraints and aggravation of taking formal employment.8  
 
Howe’s argument was informed by his belief, set out some two decades earlier, in “a ‘neo-
liberal’ Conservative approach to the welfare state” (Page, 2015, p. 64). Page (2015) argues, 
Howe rejected the tenets of social democracy in favour of free market provision and 
solutions, including freedom of individuals from state intervention, self-help and selective 
social welfare provision for those ‘whose need could not be questioned’ (Hillman and Clarke, 
1988, p. 45). Benthamite in tone, Howe’s analysis can be understood as being part of the 
‘negative’ traditions in activation-type policies, for, he argued, ‘above all’ was the issue of 
the amount of benefit payable to people outside of work.9 ‘The relative benefits the non-
worker can receive compared with in work incomes’, Howe went on, contributed to the 
‘imbalance in our society which lies behind much of our present economic trouble.’10 This 
included a shrinking GDP and, perhaps more importantly, stagflation, to which it was thought 
benefit levels were contributing by increasing unemployment and fuelling wage inflation.11 
                                                          
7 Incentives for Low paid. Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 15/2/1980, para. 2, NA 
CAB/134/4444. 
8 Incentives for Low paid. Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, para 3, NA CAB/134/4444. 
9 Incentives for Low paid. Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 15/2/1980, para. 5, NA 
CAB/134/4444. 
10 Incentives for Low paid. Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 15/21980, paras. 5 and 6, NA 
CAB/134/4444. 
11 Work Incentives for the lower paid. Report by officials, paras. 10 and 13, NA CAB/134/4444. 
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In the immediate future this ‘trouble’ could be partly addressed by ‘examin[ing] again the 
possibility of cut-off or Wage Stop arrangements.’12 Acknowledging that such a move would 
be potentially contentious, Howe nevertheless argued that it was ‘offensive to many people to 
see a man out of work who, simply due to the fact that he has a large family, is collecting – 
untaxed – any reasonable proportion of a national average wage.’13 In addition to gendered 
assumptions about male ‘breadwinning’, the implication was that the main concern of social 
security should not be the ‘needs’ of families (defined by the number of people in them), but 
how their benefit income compared to average wages. 
 
Howe was asked by E Committee to arrange for officials to examine the ‘possibility 
of imposing some kind of cut off on the size of benefit payments.’14 In the meantime, he 
wanted to announce in the rapidly approaching 1980 Budget that such a limit would be 
forthcoming. Opposition from the Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) and the 
SBC deterred him from doing this and helped establish reservations that meant the idea of a 
benefit limit would soon be aborted. 
 
Given the abolition of the Wage Stop only five years earlier,15 one of the main 
concerns was how the introduction of such a limit would be perceived. The Treasury was 
                                                          
12 Incentives for Low paid. Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 15/2/1980, para. 7(c)(iii), NA 
CAB/134/4444. 
13 Incentives for Low paid. Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 15/2/1980, para. 7(c)(iii), NA 
CAB/134/4444. 
14 Internal Memo, HM Treasury, 12/3/1980, NA T/227/5264. 
15 The abolition of the Wage Stop was informed by policy concerns with its complexity at a time when its use 
was falling (The Wage Stop and the Future Development of Social Security Benefits, NA AST/36/1441), and by 
the social justice concerns of Minister of State for Social Security, Brian O’Malley. ‘I do not think’, he told 
Secretary of State for Health and Social Services, Barbara Castle, ‘we can continue to operate a system which 
keeps some children in large families below their supplementary benefit scale rates.’ (O’Malley to Castle, 
26/6/1974, NA AST/36/1441). He noted there were ‘strong humanitarian grounds for lifting the extra burden 
from the very small remaining group of hard-pressed families’. Protecting social assistance from ‘abuse’, 
O’Malley argued, should not fall on those families. (O’Malley to Chief Secretary to the Treasury, October, 
1974, NA AST/36/1441). 
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warned it was under-estimating how politically controversial a new benefit restriction would 
be. Patrick Jenkin (Secretary of State for Social Services), for instance, argued a new benefit 
limit would ‘offer a slogan to our critics’ and questioned whether the Conservatives wanted 
to be ‘branded as the Party that reintroduced the detested wage stop?’16 Public opposition to a 
benefit limit would come from the SBC. Although it had not been the most enthusiastic 
supporter of the Wage Stop’s abolition in 1975,17 the Treasury was told, it was almost 
‘certain to oppose such a proposal strongly and publicly.’18  
 
Jenkin also thought plans for social security that had already been agreed in Cabinet 
and were to be included in two 1980 social security acts were controversial enough. He 
noted: ‘No Government has previously attempted to either remove benefit, or to reduce their 
value; and we shall be doing both at once.’19 And with the addition of a benefit limit, Jenkin 
also thought it would be impossible to resist calls for the development of hardship provision, 
which would be difficult to implement because of a ‘squeeze’ in DHSS worker numbers,20 
part of the first Thatcher government’s desire to ‘roll back’ the state. 
 
Officials worked up three possible models of a benefit limit: a ‘cut-off’ set at a 
proportion of average earnings; one related to households’ circumstances and a compromise 
between the two, an approach that used average earnings, but which was also adjusted for 
                                                          
16 Patrick Jenkin to Geoffrey Howe, 14/3/1980 (NA BN/13/605). 
17 In 1974 it was split on whether the Wage Stop should be abolished. Some SBC members thought 
supplementary benefit ‘should not discriminate against families who had the misfortune to have lower income 
from the wage-earner’s employment than their supplementary benefit requirements.’ Others felt the Wage Stop 
was a ‘regrettable but necessary reflection of the fact that many people were unable to earn as much as their 
supplementary benefit entitlement, particularly if they had a large family.’ (The wage stop and the future 
development of social security benefits, NA AST/36/1441) 
18 SBC to the Treasury, 13/3/1980, NA BN/13/605. 
19 Jenkin to Howe, 14/3/1980, NA BN/13/605. The two 1980 social security acts restricted increases in long-
term benefits (pensions and disability benefits) to prices only (previously it was the higher of prices or wages); 
reduced by five percentage points increases in short-term benefits; abolished earnings-related supplements for 
social insurance benefits, and restricted strikers’ families’ benefits. 
20 SBC to the Treasury, 13/3/1980, NA BN/13/605. 
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family circumstances.21 Officials had sought ‘a solution which would be both simple to 
administer and fair to the beneficiary.’ Such issues were acknowledged as being in conflict – 
‘a simple scheme may be arbitrary in its effects and no solution is free from administrative 
difficulty.’22 The proposed schemes would be problematic, albeit for different reasons. 
 
Relating social assistance to average earnings meant recipients would ‘be seen to be 
receiving a lower income than the generality of those in work.’ Such a limit had the 
administrative advantage of being simple to apply, and was said to have the advantage of 
being similar to the operation of labour markets: ‘Like earnings levels, there would be no 
variation according to individual or family circumstances.’23 The lack of relationship to 
individual circumstances, however, was also its main difficulty. It would not be ‘individually 
fair’, but could be justified on the basis that a benefit payment higher than the given 
proportion of the average wage ‘would be wrong because it undermines work incentives.’24 
Officials acknowledged such an approach would particularly impact upon households 
containing ‘large’ families. It would, therefore, ‘undoubtedly cause hardship’25 and would be 
criticised as being ‘anti-family’.26 
 
Linking the benefit limit to individual circumstances did not have such disadvantages 
as it was more likely to affect childless households. In addition, such an approach would be 
administratively fairer, but more expensive, as it would be more complex to administer and 
open to greater scrutiny through appeals.27 The compromise position of starting with average 
                                                          
21 Internal Treasury memo to Chancellor of the Exchequer, 4/7/1980, NA T/227/5264. 
22 Benefit Limit. Report by Officials, July 1980, para. 6, NA T/227/5264. 
23 Benefit Limit. Report by Officials, July 1980, para. 12(a), NA T/227/5264. 
24 Benefit Limit. Report by Officials, July 1980, para. 14, NA T/227/5264. 
25 Internal note to Chancellor of the Exchequer, 4/7/1980, NA T/227/5264. 
26 Benefit Limit. Report by Officials, July 1980, para. 13(b), NA T/227/5264. 
27 Internal note to Chancellor of the Exchequer, 4/7/1980, NA T/227/5264. 
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earnings and then adjusting the restriction to family size had the advantages and 
disadvantages of both, although in watered-down forms.  
 
Overall, the report outlining the three proposals suggested concern with work 
incentives was more an issue of policy presentation and the principles to which social 
assistance might adhere, than addressing a particularly large problem. It was estimated that a 
benefit limit set at 100 percent of average earning would affect under 500 households; 12,000 
households at 50 percent of average earnings and 90,000 households at 40 percent.28 The 
gross number of households, however, was a poor measure of potential effectiveness, for 
many of those households that would be affected by a benefit limit would not have been those 
targeted by it. If, for example, the benefit limit was set at 40 percent of median income it was 
estimated 80 percent of those affected would not have had an out-of-work income higher than 
their expected in-work income.29 Such households would be having their benefit restricted 
for no work incentive reason. 
 
While some at the Treasury supported limiting social assistance to average wages and 
then adjusting for family size,30 the Chancellor of the Exchequer was no longer convinced of 
a benefit limit’s efficacy. Howe informed Margaret Thatcher that the ‘options would be 
attacked as unfair and discriminatory and would require additional staff.’ In this context, he 
argued, the ‘rationale for a scheme of this kind – that it would have a broad psychological 
effect in helping incentives across the board – is insufficiently strong for us to act at this 
stage.’31 To avoid the difficulties associated with the suggested benefit limit models, Howe’s 
view was something broader was required than adjusting the benefit incomes of a limited 
                                                          
28 Benefit Limit. Report by Officials, July 1980, para. 15, NA T/227/5264. 
29 Benefit Limit. Report by Officials, July 1980, para. 11, NA T/227/5264. 
30 Internal HM Treasury memo to Chancellor of the Exchequer, 4/7/1980, NA T/227/5264. 
31 Howe to Thatcher, 15/7/1980, NA PREM/19/1637. 
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number of recipients. He thought action was required to reduce levels of Supplementary 
Benefit, for instance, by restricting annual increases (as the 1980 social security acts had 
started) and holding back increases in the Supplementary Benefit children’s scales rates. 32 
Jenkin was scathing of this idea. He pointed to the 1979 Conservative manifesto’s pledge to 
provide ‘more effective help to those in greatest need.’ He warned: ‘We ought not to give our 
opponents any room to challenge our record on this score.’ 33 
 
Howe suggested the introduction of a benefit limit should be revisited in the autumn 
of 1980, but it never was. While the idea of restricting benefit income was not pursued, 
concerns with work incentives continued in the context of the Fowler review of social 
security policy in which the focus was upon increasing in-work incomes through selective 
wage supplements (the replacement of FIS by the more generous Family Credit). While 
consideration of a benefit limit was an expression of long-standing concerns with work 
incentives, its introduction in 1980 was resisted by the DHSS, reflecting Lister’s (1991) 
observation that the Treasury did not have everything their own way in 1980s social security 
provision, and was defeated by political concerns with its potential presentation and impacts 
upon families whose main income was social security benefits. In this context, further 
reducing the out-of-work income of the poorest households was thought to be politically 
unwise in the context of already agreed legislation that was later to be described as the  ‘great 
welfare chainsaw massacre’ because it demonstrated that ‘benefits may not constantly 
expand, and that gains previously extended may be lost’ (Mesher, 1981, p. 126).  
 
                                                          
32 Internal note, HM Treasury, 7/7/1980, NA T/227/5264. 
33 Jenkin to Thatcher, 25/7/1980, NA PREM/19/1637. 
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Underpinning these concerns was a changing nature of social security provision in 
Britain. A review of social assistance in the mid-1970s (DHSS, 1978) had recognised a need 
for simplification of social assistance in the context of its mass role in social security 
provision, a role that would only be expanded by the changes announced to national 
insurance benefits in the 1980 social security acts. These changes would increase the number 
of claimants reliant upon means-tested benefits, thereby reinforcing both the need for 
simplification and the Conservatives pledge to support those most in need. The benefit limit 
was have acted against both these. Three decades later, however, the HBC was successfully 
introduced, the reasons for which are discussed in the following section. 
 
The Household Benefit Cap 
It was seen in the previous section that in the early 1980s restricting benefit income by 
relating them to average wages, although administratively simple, was deemed problematic 
because it was not ‘individually fair’ and would create hardship through a disproportionate 
impact upon ‘large’ families. Such an approach, however, was taken with the introduction of 
HBC in 2013. How might the different outcomes of 1980 and 2010 be explained?  
 
Material differences can be highlighted. So, for example, despite both periods being 
marked by stagflation, the headline economic indicators suggest the economic situation was 
more problematic in early 1980s. The unemployment rate was rising quickly, by 22 percent 
between 1979 and 1980 and a further 41 percent between 1980 and 1981. In the later period, 
although the unemployment rate was higher (7.9 percent in 2010 compared to 6.8 percent in 
1980), it was increasing at much slower rate (4 percent between 2009 and 2010 and 3 percent 
between 2010 and 2011). Unemployment reflected and contributed to the economic collapse 
of the 1980s, with GDP falling from 3.7 percent growth in 1979 to a 2.0 percent contraction 
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in 1980. In 2010 the economy had returned to economic growth (an increase in GDP of 1.7 
percent) following contractions in both 2008 (0.3 percent) and 2009 (4.2 percent). 34  
 
In other words, the discussion of the possible introduction of a benefit limit in 1980 
came amid an economic crisis, while the HBC was announced following the worse effects of 
the North Atlantic Financial Crisis and when Britain had returned to albeit weak economic 
growth. This might suggest economic conditions are important in explaining the rejection of 
the benefit limit in 1980 and announcement of the HBC in 2010. This, however, should not 
be over-emphasised. There is not an easy relationship between economic circumstances and 
policy change and, of course, economic circumstances do not provide policy answers. There 
are various possibilities that are framed by administrative, ideological and political 
considerations, rather than economics alone.  
 
Administratively, the social security system had changed significantly by 2010. It was 
seen in the previous section, for example, that in the early 1980s the increasing importance of 
means-testing acted against the benefit limit. Such a limit would have complicated the 
administration of social assistance when its role was being extended and at a time when it 
was administered by hand, because computerisation had not reached local social security 
offices (Margetts, 1991). As the operation of the Wage Stop until 1975 had demonstrated, it 
was not impossible to limit benefit payments under such administrative conditions, but a 
benefit limit would have been staff intensive and therefore expensive to administer. By the 
2010s, however, Britain had a mature social assistance benefit regime that was primarily 
administered digitally. Like the early 1980s, social assistance in the 2010s was facing 
                                                          





substantial change. A new, single means-tested benefit (Universal Credit) was announced in 
2010 as a replacement for six such benefits – but unlike the 1980s the shift to digital 
administration meant the HBC would not be staff-intensive and, therefore, costly to 
administer. In addition, the pressure for ‘hardship’ provision had been reduced by the 
government announcing in 2010 both a reduction in funding for such provision and the 
passing of responsibility for it to local authorities (Grover, 2012).  
 
Harris (1992) argues that material pressures (and one could add opportunities) can 
only ever provide a partial analysis. She suggests, therefore, that ideas are important in 
explaining policy change. In macro-terms, however, the ideas framing social security were 
similar in 2010 to what they were in 1980. There was ideological consistency, broadly rooted 
in neoliberalism, between the 1980s and 2010s, which provided a general critique of the size 
and scope of the state. The first Thatcher government, for example, boldly proclaimed that 
‘public expenditure is at the heart of Britain's economic difficulties’ (HM Treasury, 1979, 
cited in Lister, 1991, p. 91). In 2010 the ‘days of big government’, the Coalition government 
equally boldly argued, ‘are over… centralisation and top-down control have proved a failure’ 
(HM Government, 2010, p. 7). Reflecting this, and, more specifically, in both periods there 
was a search for substantial social security savings, which in 1980 the benefit limit was 
thought to not be consistent with because of its need for additional administrative staff, and in 
2010 when it was seen as being an element in restraining spending on social security benefits.  
 
In addition, in both periods work incentives were framed by discursive ideas 
embedded in the politics of resentment (see Hoggett et al., 2013), notably appeals to 
‘fairness’ between people in and out of work. Howe’s view that it was ‘offensive to many 
people to see a man out of work... collecting... any reasonable proportion of a national 
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average wage’35 was similar to later Prime Minister David Cameron’s argument that: ‘When 
you work hard and still sometimes have to go without the things you want because times are 
tough, it’s maddening to know there are some people who could work but just don’t want to’ 
(cited in Jensen, 2018, p. 124). These tropes placed waged work and the perceived role of the 
state in disincentivising it, centre stage by drawing upon what Young (2002, p. 482) in an 
analysis of late modern vindictiveness describes as the ‘weak spots of [the public’s] character 
armour.’  
 
There were, however, differences between the two periods regarding ideas relating to 
relationships between what was described as ‘hardship’ in 1980 and work incentives and in 
relation to institutional basis of responsibility for poverty-relief.  One of the last pieces of 
legislation the 1997-2010 Labour governments introduced was the Child Poverty Act 2010. 
Its main aim was setting targets related to the eradication of child poverty by 2020/21. It 
received support from the political parties later forming the 2010-15 Coalition government. It 
might, therefore, be surprising that the Coalition sought to introduce a social security policy 
that, as was pointed out by the government’s impact assessment (Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP), 2012), would act to impoverish ‘large’ families. Stewart (2011, p. 176) 
argues that under the Coalition government families with dependent children were no longer 
understood as a ‘priority group for welfare spending’ as they had been under preceding 
Labour governments and, relatively speaking, it might be argued, under the Thatcher and 
Major Conservative governments before them.  
 
                                                          




As was seen above, in the first Thatcher government there were dissenting voices 
opposed to the benefit limit, even if their concern was with how the policy would be received 
and administered, rather than being concerned with its substance. Some policy makers 
seemingly had little difficulty with the ‘hardship’ that a benefit limit would cause, but there 
were moderating voices in the DHSS and the SBC (and one or two in the Treasury) in 
debates about the development of possible benefit limit. They pointed to the policy and 
political difficulties with restricting benefit income at a time of other cuts and a manifesto 
commitment to deliver ‘more effective help’ for those in greatest need. The relationship 
between financial resources and ‘hardship’ was highlighted, even within the context of the 
desire to improve work incentives. 
 
Thirty years later ideas about the relationship between financial resources and poverty 
had been weakened in favour of what Page (2016, p. 94) generously describes as a ‘more 
holistic anti-poverty strategy.’ While the Parliamentary Conservative Party had supported the 
Child Poverty Act 2010, it also argued it would focus upon the ‘causes rather than the 
symptoms of poverty.’36 As the Coalition government’s social security green paper, 21st 
Century Welfare (Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, 2010) demonstrated, work 
incentives were to be central to this focus. By defining wage-labour as an anti-poverty 
measure, those mechanisms concerned with work incentives could themselves be defined as 
helping to address poverty. Given Dinan’s (2019) observation, noted above, that work-related 
activation can occur by reducing benefit levels, this was always going to be problematic for 
unemployed households because in this logic reduced benefit levels could be justified as 
being an anti-poverty measure. The 2015 Conservative manifesto made the argument. In the 
                                                          




context of understanding waged work as being ‘the best weapon against poverty’, it noted 
that the HBC would be reduced in value to help ‘reward work’. 37 As a consequence, recent 
British governments seemingly have had few qualms about pushing families deeper into 
poverty in the name of work incentives. The impoverishing effects of this were recognised in 
the Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016. It replaced the Child Poverty Act 2010 with the Life 
Chances Act 2010. In doing so, it abolished the financial measure poverty targets. This was a 
consequence of the Conservative government’s preference for addressing what it saw as the 
causes, rather than the symptoms, of poverty, and the fact it had little chance of meeting the 
targets because of the announcement in 2015 of a further £12 billion per annum cuts to social 
security, which included lowering the HBC. 
 
In such observations, continuity and change with the ideas of 1980 is visible. Change 
is reflected in the indifference by the 2010s to the hardship that restricting benefit income 
would create. There had been a move away from ‘social security’ to a concern with waged 
work, reflected, for example, in the replacement of the Department of Social Security with 
the DWP, structured by a ‘commitment to forging and consolidating the relationship between 
welfare and work’ (McCafferty and Mooney, 2007, p. 214) . Concern about the ‘welfare’ of 
individuals has been lost to, and defined by, the relationship of individuals to waged work. In 
this context, penury became the mechanism to incentivise people to take such work. While 
the 1980s discussion of a benefit limit was informed by such concerns with work incentives, 
it was also tempered by a post-WWII institutional concern with social protection expressed 
by Patrick Jenkin and officials at the DHSS and the SBC, and some voices within the 
Treasury. By the 2010s this had been replaced by, as Carmel and Papadopoulas (2003) 
describe it, a concern with ‘support’ policies aimed at changing the behaviour of individuals. 




Such developments did not occur to pave the way for the HBC’s introduction, but they helped 
create a policy environment which lessened potential objections to a new benefit restriction. 
In brief, within government there was less concern with state’s role in inducing poverty in the 
2010s compared to the early 1980s. The implication was that if poverty were to be addressed, 
it would have to be done by institutions outside of the state in a way that maintained the 
incentive to work. 
 
For working age people, the 2010’s decade of ‘austerity’ shifted the focus from 
redistribution to ‘predistribution’. The idea of predistribution first gained traction in Britain in 
the Labour Party in what can be understood as a ‘weak’ or ‘limited’ version of it (Ussher, 
2012; Lansley, 2014). Then Leader of the Labour Party, Ed Miliband (2012, p. 6), for 
instance, argued: ‘Centre‐left governments of the past tried to make work pay better by 
spending more on transfer payments. Centre‐left governments of the future will have to also 
make work pay better by making work itself pay’. Such ideas helped inform critiques of the 
so-called ‘tax credit economy’ (Cameron, 2006), a neologism describing attempts to 
incentivise work through the supplementing of low wages via means-tested cash transfers 
(which, as noted above, were first introduced by the Health-led Conservative government 
elected in 1970). The emphasis in predistribution was upon increasing wages, rather than the 
state supplementing wages.  
 
The issue of wages was raised in discussion about the possible introduction of a 
benefit limit in 1980. A minimum wage, officials highlighted, might appear to be ‘an obvious 
answer’ to work incentive issues.38 They, however, also acknowledged that such a 
                                                          
38 Work Incentives for the Lower Paid, para. 25, NA CAB/134/4444. 
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development was ‘against the general thrust of Government Policy.’39 The government’s 
position was that to address unemployment the costs of employing workers had to be 
reduced. Hence, it abolished the remaining Wages Councils that had regulated wages in 
selective and various industries since the first decade of the 20th century. 
 
The situation had changed by the second decade of the 21st century. Britain’s first-
ever National Minimum Wage was introduced in 1999 by a Labour government. It was 
opposed by Conservative politicians who argued it would destroy jobs (see Michael Portillo, 
then Secretary of State for Employment, Employment Committee, 1995). In contrast, David 
Cameron, as the new leader of the Conservative Party, acknowledged in 2005 that the NMW 
had been a success. Central to Cameron’s brand of Conservatism was the idea that while 
there was a need for collective responses to economic and social dilemmas, such responses 
did not have to be via the state (Ellison, 2011). As a weak form of predistribution, the NMW 
was consistent with such ideas, which shaped the announcement in the same 2015 Budget in 
which the HBC was reduced that the government intended to develop the NMW into a (mis-
labelled) National Living Wage for workers aged 25 or over. 
 
The combination of the increased minimum wage and the cuts to benefits, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, argued, would help shift Britain ‘from a low 
wage, high tax, high welfare economy to the higher wage, lower tax, lower welfare 
country.’40 Although because of their different distributional bases, increases in the minimum 
wage could not make up for the cuts to benefits, the former were held up as a means of off-
setting cuts to benefit incomes by placing greater responsibility on non-state institutions 
                                                          





(employers in this instance) for supporting workers and their families. This, it was hoped, 
would have had the dual effect of increasing work incentives and reducing the responsibilities 
of the state. 
 
Conclusion 
Lister (1991, p. 103) argues that the cuts to social security benefits in 1980 ‘might have been 
considerably worse than they in fact were.’ We have seen in this article that, had the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer got his way, they could have included the introduction of a 
benefit limit, introduced as a work incentive measure to help reduce unemployment and wage 
inflation. The benefit limit, however, was rejected. The significance of this was heightened 
three decades later by the announcement of the HBC in 2010. This article has demonstrated 
that the enduring concerns with work incentives that frame Britain’s social security system, 
but also that those concerns are not enough to guarantee the introduction of policies aimed at 
increasing the financial incentive for people to take waged work. Cuts to benefits are 
undoubtedly a ‘negative’ form of work activation-type activity concerned with increasing the 
economic cost of not engaging in waged work. As such, they are sensitive to interpretations 
of political concerns with their presentation and possible impacts. In the early 1980s, it was 
not possible to overcome such concerns in a worsening economic situation and a commitment 
to the poorest people in the context of a shifting social security framework in which greater 
import was being placed upon means-testing through a concerted erosion of social insurance 
benefits. At the time, a further negative change was felt to be politically intolerable, 
especially when, in the words of Geoffrey Howe, such a policy would in any case not ‘have a 




Three decades later, and as part of a wider package of cuts to social security benefits, 
the HBC was successfully introduced. While there were economic and administrative 
differences between the 1980s and 2010s, that are likely to have an impact, the introduction 
of the HBC is better understood as reflecting shifting ideas about the roles of social security, 
for example, expressed in the development of the ‘incentive paradigm’ concerned with 
manipulating rational economic behaviours and the loss of concern with the hardship that 
would come with the introduction of a benefit restriction. In addition, was the view that 
institutions other than the state, notably employers in the case of the HBC, were better placed 
to address poverty through paying higher wages, which would also buttress work incentives 
while also divesting the state of such responsibilities. The criticisms highlighted during the 
debate about the introduction of the benefit limit in 1980, however, remain. It is a policy that 
is contributing to poverty. It leaves many households to which it is applied being unable to 
afford necessities, including adequate food, heat and rent (DWP, 2014a), and it only has a 
small impact on the waged work activity of a minority of claimants (DWP, 2014b). 
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